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Abstract

While still in its infancy, Electronic Commerce is growing ut an exponential rate each
year (Walson, 1997. p.53). Although few doubt that such growth will only continue in
years to come, many people still h<'lvc serious reservations about the levels of security
offered by currently available applications for conducting sli.:h trade. 1 his thesis
id::mifies some of the key areas of concem regarding Electronic Commerce on the
lntemet. and looks at the

\·v~tys

in which the Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) model.

proposed by Ma:'tcl{:ard and Visa.
identifies and

J~scrihcs

succct~ds

or fails in addressing these concems. It

the key dements and primary functions of the SET protocols in

a manner that wil! enahh: :.tudcnts and other intere~tcd
pmtocob lJLiickly and easily.
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1. Introduction
Many of the major transitional periods in hist01y have been influenced by the
development nf new or improved avenues of communicution, trade and produ.:tion.
Today we live in a highly consumer oriented world, in which tntde directly inlluences
not only our individual lifestyles, but the stability and

<~ftluencc

of our economic and

Pl'litical systems as a whole.

1.1. Background of Thesis
In recent years the constant increase in till' availability of cost-cffcctiw technology has
lead to whole new vistas of potential consumerism and communication. We are rapidly
approaching a time where even the smallest of merchants will he able to

marl~ct

their

goods or services to individuals all over the world. and where produccrs und
wholesalers may suddenly find it cost·cffectivc to bypass rctai!crs all together and
market themselves directly to the public. All of this is primarily the result of the global
communications network now known as the Internet. The Internet is allmving
businesses of all descriptions to communicate with a broader range of consumers. using
the power of computer-based multimedia.

The capacity for businesses to instantaneously communicate data and information with
other offices, businesses and consumers, across wst distunces is rcvolutionising
established working practices. By using the computerised communications nc!work that
now spans the globe, information can be shared across corporate, geographic and
political boundaries with the grcutest of ease. Virtual organisations (as described in
Section 2.3.1.) arc now becoming a reality.
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This capacity to do business electronically, known as Electronic Commerce, is changing
the face of business, providing enormous opportunities for those who take advantage of
it. There is little douht that many new f01tunes will be made, and many others will
change hands as the race for mastery of the global economic community is run.
Projections for the growth of Electronic Commerce

indica~e

that by the year 2000 such

transactions could reach up to US$30 billion per annum (Somlyody, 1996, [on-line]).

1.2. Significance_of Thesis
With any new form of communication there arc always problems that need to be
addressed thtt)ugh the development of appropriate procedures, protocols and standards.
The rapid development of the lntcrnl.!t, and its phenomenal popularity and use, has
created an environment filled with both pamnoia .:md lcgitim.:lle conccms .:ts to the
security and privacy offered to users. The Internet is an open system. with a dynamic
number of users, no universal regulation, and a seeming lawlessness that rivals the Wild
West of old. It is natural enough then that one of the major issues that commercial users
of the Internet arc concerned ubout is security (Ford & Baum, 1997, p. 2). It is
predominantly this issue and some of the possible solutions thereof. with which this
thesis will deal.

The Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) specification defines new protocols that could
potentially address this issue. SET is a specification for an application-level protocol
thnt appears to provide a secure methodology for payment card transactions over the
Internet. "Payment cards" include credit cards, debit cards, and all forms of proprietary
payment cards offered by private companies and organisations. Masterminded by Visa
and MasterCard, version 1.0 of the SET specifications was released on May 31 ~~. 1997.
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If successful, SET will probably be adopted by most, if not all, of the major payment
card brands as the industry standard for secure payment card transactions over the
Internet. Indeed, apart from MasterCard and Visa, several other significant payment
card brands have already declared their support, including American Express, the third
largest in the world ("Visa and MasterCard welcome American Express", 1996,

[on~

line]).

Paymem cards are one of the very few non

Internet~specific

forms of payment available

for electronic transactions on the Internet (see Appendix A for allemate Internet
payment methods). As many people already have payment cards, <i.nd many merchants
ulready nccept them. it would seem logical that consumers are unlikely to be desirous of
having to learn how to usc new and unorthodox forms of payment. Because of this, a
standard that provides for secure payment card transactions across the Internet is
obviously highly desimblc for both consumers and merchants alike.

By providing an objective overview of the primary security concerns related to
Electronic Commerce, ami reviewing the effectiveness of the SET protocols, both on its
own merits and compared to the existing dcfacto .>l'tndard. this thesis will clarify the
progress being made in this area, and the curre11t directions of the industry.

1.3. Purpose of Thesis
This thesis gives a brief overview of the factors

th~1t

have lead Electronic Commerce to

develop to its current state. The significant security issue.'i .:1rc identified, <1nd how they
arc addressed by hath the current standard protocol (Secure Sockets Layer) and. the SET
protocols will be discussed. However, the main aim of the thesis is a review of the key
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e:ements and functions of the SET protocols, and their effectiveness in addressing some
of the primary areas of concern relating to secure Electronic Commerce on the Internet.

1.4. Research Questions
In order to appreciate the scope and consequent difficulties involved in doing definitive
work in the area of Electronic Commerce. i1 is

necc~'sary to

appreciate the number of

different fields that impinge upon it. :\t the highe!-,t level of<.1bstraction, teci"'nical
requirements, political and legal boundaries. economic l.'Onslraints, .:md moral and
ethical values unci systems intluencc the issues involved.

The

foCU'i

of the reseurch in this thesis is the erteL·tivcness of the SET pro1ocnls in

addressing the security of payment card transactions on the Internet. Consequently. the
rrimary questions to he addressed in the thesis arc:
,.. What arc the

~.:ommonly

accepted cuncl!rns

r~~gurding

the security of consumer-

based Electronic Commerce on the lnternl!t"?
,. Wlmt arc the key elements and functions of the SET model"?
,.. Do the SET protocols adequately address the security concerns identified, either
partially or in full?
,.. How does the security offered by SET compare to that of the current dcfacto
standard (SSL).

1.5. Scope of Thesis
Concerns regarding the security of Electronic Commerce are many und varied, rant::,ing
from purely technical aspects of implementation through to the sociological impact that
Electronic Commerce is going to have on the global commllnity. This thesis focuses on
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security concerns that can be addressed through the adoption of suitable technical
~.tandards.

In some cases this includes non-technical issues, although such issues are in

the minority of those addressed.

The thesis describes the efti:ctiwnes:; of the SET protocols in addressing the primary
arcns of concern related to secure Electronic Commerce, as are generally accepted by
the majority of the associated contemporary literature. Unfortunately, the relatively
short amount of time availabk for the preparati<1n of an Honours thesis has precluded
the in-depth study of a number of related areas.

The implementation spedfics of the SET protocols have not been discussed. which has
kad to the omission of in-depth di!;.::ussion on a number of issues. These include
associated problem areas th;tt arc currently outside the scope of !he specifications, such
as ··Denial of Service ..

~tttacks.

ami the possible integration or SET into other developing

technologies such o.ts :-.mart cmds.

The entire Ekctronic Cmnmen:e re·mlution. and <til the nssociated areas .such a<;
networking r.•.'t."hnologics. conununication protocols. authentication systems and
technologies, law. ethics and privacy policies, payment methods and infrastructures. and
many others. me all progressing at an ever increasing rate of development. It would be
impossible to provide sufficient discussion on all these topics without muny years of
involved research. Consequently, this thesis has been constrained to providing the
reader with a comprehensive unoerstanding or the issues that much of the work in these
arcus is trying to address, and the cfticacy of the SET protocols in doing so.
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1.6. Structure of Thesis
Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of the current

stall~

of Electronic Commerce. It looks

briefly at the Internet, and ut Electronic Data Interchange, the principal forerunner to the
brouder form of Electronic Commerce thnt we know today. However, the primary focus
is on secure retail electronic transactions, which is the u.rea that the SET protocols arc
primarily concerned with. The discussion is extended to cover some of the more
atypical payment method<.; proposed or currently av<lilable on the Internet, some of the
problems perceived \vith !he current systems, and the nature of a typical transaction.

Chapter 3 discusses encryption, one of the more powerful tools for protecting data on
the Internet. Encryption is certainly nothing new to many people, but modem
cryptogw.phic techniques. utilising the processing power of computers, are proving to be
the cornerstone on which most "secure" software is built. This chapter looks at secret
key and puhlic key methods, two significant fom1s of encryption curremly in use.

Additionally. it describes some of the more useful techniques that are utilised in
combination with encryption, like digital signature.\· and message digests, which are
significant clements in security protocols such as SET and the Secure Sockets Layer
(SSL).

The basic functionality of the SSL is discussed in Chapter 4. SSL is widely accepted as
the current defacto )'iecurity protocol for the Internet. Despite this, SSL was not
designed with Electronic Commerce specifically in mind, and consequently has a
number of limitations when used for this kind of transaction.
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Chapter 5 looks at the specilics of the SET protocols. It outlines the objectives and
scope of SET, and identifies the key participants, clements and processes involved in a
SET transaction. The cryptographic techniques employed by SET a.rc described.
including the introduction of dual signatures. a new technique introduced for the first
time in the SET specifications ("Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) Specification
Book 1: Busines.', Description", 1997, [on-line]), hereafler known as the SET Business
Description ( 1997). The usc of digital certificates in SET is discussed, as is the
"hierarchy of trust" required for SET compliant certificate authorities.

Chapter 6 then looks at the overall effectiveness of '5ET. and compares its efficacy with
that of SSL as il security protocol for Electronic Commerce transactions. The
comparative criteria are based on the key requirements of electronic payment systems
(see Chapter 2), and include authenticmion, compatibility, payment security,
information integrity and non-repudiation.

A summary of the significant conclusions that can be drawn from the thesis is contained
in Chapter 7. The key issues that have been identified within the

thesi~

are recapped in

a manner that clearly identities the relative strengths and weaknesses of payment cards
in general, as well as outlining the broader issues thut require further research.
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2. Contemporary Electronic Commerce
Electronic Commerce as we know it today is probably better known for its problems
than its benefits. The public is being bombarded with horror stories that focus on either
the dangers of elusive computer criminals (Ford & Baum, 1997, p. 3), or on the
st~pposed

totalitarian state that Big Brother is surreptitiously ushering in behind the

!'icenes (Bacard, n.d., [on-line]). Consequently, despite the general apathy that pervades
our society, people aren't quite ready to sit back and put their own finances on the line
until they're sure it's safe to do so ("Electronic Commerce'', 1997, [on-line]).

Many potential participants in Electronic Commerce on the Internet currently feel that
they have something to worry about (Driscoll, Jain, Lyons, Nuckols & Roberts, 1997,
[on-line]). The public want personal privacy, the merchants want to be protected
against fraud, and everyone with a direct connection to the Internet wants to be sure that
their system is o;afe against unauthorised entry (Scollay, 1997, [on-line]). This chapter
briefly outlines the development of the Internet and Electronic Commerce. and discusses
a few of the more significant topics and issues related to these areas.

2.1. Electronic Data Interchange (EDI)
In order for the international business community to take advantage of electronic
communication, it tirst needed to develop a standardised data fom1at. This would
enable various computers in different geographical locations, and possibly mnning
completely different operating systems and/or applications, to exchange data and
scamlessly integrate it into their own systems.
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Forward thinking companies who pioneered various techniques for transferring data in
formats that could be processed on receipt had no guarantees that the idea would be
embruced by other businesses. Their efforls have been described as an "act of blind
faith" ("A Brief History of Electronic Commerce", 1996, [on-line]). This was prior to
anyone using the terms Eleclronic Commerce or Electronic Data Interchange (EDI).
The understanding that such common formats were necessary lead to the inception of
associated standards bcdies in Europe and !he USA.

EDI can be summed up as the exchange of standards-based, structured data between
computer applications. The obvious advantage of this is that the exchanged data can be
moved between syslcms without the need for rekeying. "Because it can speed the flow
of information and pass data automatically to other automated applications, EDI is a
powerful tool for improving business processes." (Morell, Neal & Fries, 1995, [online]).

A number of Value Added Networks (VAN) were created in the eighties, targeting
major industry groups, in an attempt to generate significant industry interest in ED I,
which was claimed to reduce traditional business proces~ing costs by around 66%.
However, it was only with the advent of the Internet as a commercial network that
widespread interest in EDI was observed. The primary reason for this was the
estimation that Internet based EDI would decrease the cost of conventional business
procedures by a further 66% on standard EDI savings (Watson, 1997, p. 55).

Edith Cowan University
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2.2. The lntern?t
The first real step towards the Internet as we know it today was in 1969. when the US
Defense Advanced Research f-rojects Agency (DARPA) was commissioned to research
network protocols. A.;; a result of their work. in 1973 the Transmission Control
Protocol/lntemet Protocol (TCPIIP) was recommended as a standard networking
protocol for compm~r network communication. According to Bruce & Dempsey

(1997), the populmity oi'TCP/JP rose sharply in 1983 when the version of UNIX
rdeased by the University of California at Berkley included this network protocol. This
lead to TCI-'/IP becoming the de facto standard.

ln 1986, the Nationul Science Foundation (NSF) decided to network their nutionwir'·"
supercomputer sites in nrder to improve efficiency. The high-speed network used to
connect the NSF supercomputers formed the backbone of the Internet, although the tenn
backbone is often used in a more geneml manner to include high-capacity telephone
links, microwaves, lasers, fibre optics, and satellites, connecting networks, computer
sites, and people (Eddings, 1994, p. 9). Today the Internet has evolved into a shared
network, connecting busines...;;cs, universities and private homes all over the world.

The term Internet is used to describ!~ the common network communications, and is
actually made up of various services that use the TCPIIP protocols (Bruce & Dempsey,

1997, p. 220). TCP/IP is actually a number of different protocols, with different
functions, bundled together. At the center of this web of protocols is the Internet
Promcol (IP), which is a packet multiplexer. "Messages from higher level protocols

7n~i=ve=r=s~icy~-------------------------------·-----------10
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have an IP Header prepended to them. They are then sent to the appropriate device

driver for transmission." (Cheswick & Bellovin, 1994, p. 19}.

One of the key benefits derived from the nature of1'CP/IP is its robl'stness. The weblii.e nature of the Internet means that TCP/IP can channel data through a wide range of
ahernate nodes when transmitting from point A to point B. There are many different
paths through which the data can tlow, consequently, the network as a whole can suffer
massive degradation and still keep functioning. Obviously, this was a highly desirable
attribute where the Department of Defense was concerned. However, this very attribute
is also one of the main security weaknesses of the Internet (Pfleeger, 1997. p. 390).

One of the more recently developed Internet services, and certainly the best known, is
the World Wide Web (WWW). a simple, browser based graphical user interface
providing point-and-click navigation of the entire Internet With improvements in
browser technology, the WWW is providing a simple, yet effective, multimedia
platform from which anyone can participate on the Internet.

According to Tom Miller ( 1997) of the Emerging Technologies Research Group, the
number of adult users of the Internet in the USA alone exceeds 40 million. with over 30
million of those using the WWW. The USA is estimated to contain the majority of
Internet conn~cted households, with approximately 66% of the worldwide total. The
remainder is fairly evenly split between Europe and the Australasian/Pacific region
("Geographies", 1997, [on-line}). According to this particular survey, current
predictions are for the total number of Internet users to triple by the year 2000.
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Of cuurse it must be noted that it is notoriously difficult to get consistent statistics
regarding Internet user demographics, as each different survey uses its own criteria.
Factors that can vary include; whether a person actually uses the Internet, or merely has
access, the timeframe within which the user must have Jogged on last, and whether the
access is from home, work, or both. Nevertheless, the one

inescapabl~

fact is that the

Internet, and in particular the WWW, is changing the way in which a growing number
of people communicate and otherwise interact with the global community as a whole.
Time and geographical location are no longer significant barriers to like-minded
individuals of all persuasions sharing thoughts and ideas, or conducting business.

2.3. Elect;-onic Commerce
The term Electronic Commerce is a relativc~.f new one, and can be considered to stem
from a broadening of EDI. It evolved from the realisation that if a wider variety of
messaging solutions were available, then far more could be gained from network
communications than simply the exchange of raw data ("Some definitions of Electronic
Commerce'". 1996. [on-line]).

In broad terms Electronic Commerce is the conduct of business using a combination of
structured and unstructured message exchunge (EDI und e-mail), as well as binary data
exchange, shared data, databases and datubase access, across the entire range of
networking technologies, and across both public and private sectors ("ECA- Aims and
Objec..."'tives", n.d .•. [on-lincl). "As the Internet h:.t'i proved, we now live in a global
community .... We can do business with anyone. anywhere in the world, at any time."
("Changing the Way you do Business", 1996, (on-line]).
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Essentially there are two distinct areas within Electronic Commerce. The first is the
capacity for businesses to communicate information between their offices, suppliers and
business partners. This type of inter-business Electronic Commerce is embodied by
standards such as EDI, which is a subset of Electronic Commerce describing purely
inter~process

(computer to computer) communication (Houser, 1995, [on-line]).

The second type of Electronic Commerce is the ability for businesses to directly market
their goods or services to a wider range of consumers. Essentially, wholesale and retail
sales.

Electronic Commerce as a whole recognises the additional need for inter-personal
(human to human) communication, funds transfers, and file sharing (Houser, 1995,

[on~

line]). In either case, according to Watson ( 1997), it is not a matter whether businesses
should be on the Internet or not, but rather a matter of how and when.

2.3.1. Inter-business Electronic

Commerc~

Business is largely about the right people having the right information at the right time.
This often means simply staying in communication with geographically separate
components of the business ("Changing the Way you do Business", 1996, [on-line]).
The functions such inter-business communication is currently used for include; the
updating of stock, orders and financial data, compilation and exchange of statistical
information, exchange of graphics, voice and video data, and the facility to work on
designs or common documents ("Some Definitions of Electronic Commerce", 1996,
[on-line]).
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Indeed, the constant improvement of the global telecommunications networks, enabling
virtually instantaneous data exchange, have lead the business community to completely
re-evaluate traditional strategies and philosophies. It is not enough for businesses
simply to "upgrade" their technology to utilise Electronic Commerce; they must be
willing to embrace new work practices if they wish to do more than merely streamline
what already exists (''The Future", 1996, [on-line]). If businesses try to take shortcuts ir.
introducing the concept of Electronic Commerce to their existing structure, that is to say
that they fail to adopt appropriate work practices that capitalise on it, they run the risk of
spending money for little or no gain ("Business Process Redesign", 1996, [on-line}).

In the document "Changing the Way you do Business" ( 1996) tbe author(s) identify
three key steps commonly implemented in order to successfully expand an existing
business into the world of Electronic Commerce.

1. Introduce electronic alternatives to existing manual and paper-based operations.

2. Consider, adapt and simplifY the information flows.
3. Use the improved information flows in new and dynamic ways.

It should be noted that "information flows" does not simply refer to compmer-tocomputer communication. Predominantly it refers to the way information is used and
distributed in combination with the adoption of Flexible Working practices. Such
practices can include; telecommuting, distributed offices, mobile workers, virtual teams,
desk sharing, job sharing, flexible or part time working hours, carer breaks, or even
complete relocation of business ("Flex1ble Working", 1996, [on-line]).
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Electronic Commerce is about consumers, businesses and business partners being able
to share information dectronically, thereby improving the efficiency, economy and
competitiveness of business practices.

2.3.2. Consumer-based Electronic Commerce
The relatively recent advcnr of the WWW plat!Orm has brought a sizeable portion of the
world population "online" virtually overnight. Suddenly any business with a few spare
dollars can market themselves, potentially, to upwurds of 45 million people all over the
world, 24 hours u duy, 365 days a year. In addition to the number of potential
consumers, there is also the fact that u large number of Internet users have purticularly
attractive demographics from the perspective of merchants, i.e. age, income, education,
etc. ("CommerccNet I Nielsen Internet Demographics Survey", 1997, [on-line]).

It would seem reasonable thm as more people gain accr,ss to this developing
marketpluce, and as stable and secure financial

service~

are developed to service it, the

WWW will become increusingly consumer-driven. It is estimated that 21% or the
current users of the WWW alreudy have and continue to purchuse goods electronically
(Miller, 1997, [on-line]).

New "electronic shopfronts" are springing up daily, marketing a wide range of goods
and services to the world. The WWW now provides a rich multimedia environment,
enabling marketers to realise the full possible impact of the advertising dollars they
spend. The services that can be provided online can include functions like; consumers
choosing from the goods or services offered, order and delivery details, after sales
service facilities, and payment procedures. One of the key advantages of the Internet as
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a forum for Electrordc Commerce is that when a merchant updates infonnation such as
stock, prices, special offers, or any other information for customers, such changes are
usually immediately available to consumers ("The Possibilities with Electronic
Commerce", n.d.,

[on~line]).

From the consumer's point of view, Electronic Commerce has many potential
advantages to offer over more traditional methods of buying. Apart from a potentially
enormous marketplace, increased physical safety (Watson, 1997, p. 52), and the obviou;)
multifarious benefits in terms of time, effort and improved service (Ford & Baum, 1997,
p. 2), Electronic Commerce can also be used to "personalise" shopping. Data about an
individual's visit to a site can be stored for use against future visits. For example, if you
bought a Computer Science textbook from a WWW bookshop, the next time you visited
that site the web server might choose to show you any specials on Computer Science
texts when you arrive. Likewise, frequent customers might be given discounts or other
special offers automatically.

Nevertheless, despite all the promise that this type of commerce holds, many people still
have serious reservations about the ease and safety of using it (Hoffman, Novak &
Chatterjee, 1995, [on~line]). The bottom line still remains the same; if Electronic
Commerce is to fulfil its potential, methods for conducting electronic payments must be
universal, automated, convenient and, of course, secure.

2.3.3. Payment Alternatives
With the ever-increasing popularity of the Internet. the viability of this new medium as a
potential tool for commerce is becoming almost impossible to ignore. As a
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consequence, many innovative merchants and banks are starting to move quickly to
establish themselves as pioneers in the marketplace, and so gain an advantage over their
competitors ("'SET Business Description", 1997, p. 1).

Although the exact nature of commerce on the Internet is yet to be clearly defined, what
is clear is that "where\ ..:r there are electronic [monetary] transactions, financial
institutions have a major stake - particularly in the face of non-traditional competition."
("Acquiring Internet Transactions", n.d., [on-line]). In the SET Business Description
( 1997), MasterCard and Visa ullude to the fact that financial institutions have a vested
interest in the rapid growth of Electronic Commerce. This is because a much higher
percentage of the associated transactions will use payment card products than cheques
or cash.

Thus far there huve been a number of payment schemes implemented for transactions
across the Internet. ''The first payments for services on the Internet were conventional
ones. Subsclibers transferred monthly fees for a service from their bank-account into
the accounts of the selling party." ("Money on the Internet", n.d., [on-line]). This
method of payment was slow, expensive and relatively inefficient, especially when
dealing with merchants in other countries.

Next came payment card transactions, complete with all the

a~.sociated

security issues.

An early attempt to resolve some of these issues saw the introduction of third party
companies ("Money on the Internet", n.d., [on-line]). These companies collect and
approve payments between clients, and then bill the clients for their total accumulated
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expenditure on a periodic basis, removing the necessity of making multiple payment
card payments for possibly insignificant amounts.

The use of third party companies, or even simply the use of payment cards themselves,
can lead to potential violations of privacy. If details of individual payment card
transactions arc gathered in one centralised system, including where, when and what is
purchased, this data can be used to tell much about the person involved, and can conflict
with the individual's right to privacy ("Money on the Internet", n.d., [on-line]).

According to Neuman & Mcdvinsky ( 1995), the important characteristics that an
lnlcmet payment infrastru<-'Lltrc must provide include security, reliability, scalability,
anonymity, acceptability, customer base, tlexibility, convertibility, efficiency, and ease
of use. These can be described as follows:

Security- Information is power in many cases, and often financial information most of
all.

Bc~.:ause

of the sensitive

n<~.ture

of much of the information contained in financial

Internet transactions, they are likely targets for computer criminals. Due to the open
nature (accessibility) of the Internet, a high degree of security is required for such
transactions.

Reliability -If we continue to see the exponential growth of Electronic Comme1·ce that
we have witnessed thus far, the reliability of p:tyment systems will become increasingly
critical to the functionality of not only individual businesses, but also, potentially, whole
economies. The more critical this payment infrastructure becomes, the more likely a
target it also becomes fer vandals and subversives. These systems will need to be
~E~d~it7
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robust, with substantial redundancy built into them. Thankfully. by its very nature the
Internet does much to support this exact requirement (see Section 2.2).

Scalability- Obviously, any payment system implemented on the Internet must support
the potential for substantial growth. Any system that depends on central payment
servers is probably going to have limited growth potential, and will likely suffer
degradation of performance as the number of users and merchants grows.

Anonymity- The privacy of individual spending patterns needs to be protected from
sources outside the financial institutions involved in a given transaction. Under some
payment schemes it is impossible for consumers not to identify themselves to acquiring
financial institutions when purchasing goods or ~ervices. However, it may occasionally
be desirable for a cnnsumer to maintnin their anonymity to any other parties. Any

successful payment schemes arc likely to be able to provide this anonymity when
required.

Acceptability and Customer base-- The more widely accepted a method of payment is,
the more useful it

i~

to those who have it. If a payment system is widely held by

consumers, but only accepted by relatively few merchants, then it is probably doomed to
be superceded by a more widely accepted method of payment. The same is conversely
true of merchants. If a payment system is widely accepted by merchants, but is used by
few consumers, then the same result is likely. Likewise, if a payment system is accepted
by a variety of separate payment servers, these servers must be able transact payments
with each other, otherwise the usefulness of the payment system is restricted.
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Flexibility -A comprehensive payment infrastructure for the Internet would probably
need to support a variety of transaction types, analogous to more traditional payment
options such as cash, cheques and payment cards. These will be necessary to support
the differing requirements of each transaction, i.e. anonymity, speed, size of transaction,
auditability, and so on.

Convertibility- Because each individual consumer will require some or all of the
above different transaction types, it follows that there will certainly be a requirement
that one fom1 of fund-, within the overall payment infrastructure be convertible to any
other form with minimal effort.

Efficiency and Ease of use- Because some payments on the Internet are bound to be
very small, possibly in the order of a few cents, a method of payment is required that has
transaction costs economic enough to meet such payments without being noticed.
Additionally, payments of this magnitude should be able to be made automatically and
without loss of perfonnance, although the user should be able to monitor his/her
spending at all times, and should have to manually authorise payments exceeding a set
amount.

Ease of implementation- Ideally, an application level protocol should be developed to
allow not only payment services of the same type to interact, but payment services of all
types. This would enable developers to only have to worry about meeting one set of
communication protocol requirements, with a standard level of service available to
higher level applk~'tions.
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There are presently a substantial nmil.ber or existing or proposed electronic payment
schemes and products available, with more appearing on a regular basis. A table
containing references to infmmation on many of these schemes and/or research lists is
given in Appendix A.

Obviously, it is not practical to outline all of these methods herein. Instead, the
following subwsections outline a few of the better known and more generic payment
systems that currently exist on the Internet. These systems typify the concepts
embodied by many other similar payment schemes, and can be classified into three
general categories:

I. Electronic currency systems (ccash)
2. Credit-debit systems (NetChequc)
3. Secure payment card systems (CybcrCash).

2.3.4. ecash
DigiCash's ecash is purported to be the digital equivalent of cash, and is a good
example of electronic currency. Users can withdraw "digital coins" from their Internet
bank account and store them on their hard disk. According to DigiCash ("An
Introduction to ccash", 1997, [onwline]), ecash offers payment that is fast, anonymous,
and trm:eable.

According to Neuman and Medvinsky ( 1995), users of electronic currem:y have to first
establish an account with a currency .~erver on the Internet. They can then purchase
currency certificates through this account, or by using credit cards, electronic cheques,
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or paper money through reverse teller machines. Once issued, the currenc.;)' certificates
represent a set value, which can be spent with merchants who accept them. or deposited
into other accounts on similar currency servers.

Perhaps the most attractive aspect of the ecash concept i'.i the anonymity that it offers.
Unlike other method'i of payment, there is no requirement for a purchaser to divulge any
more ill formation about their identity than they wish ("The Ease of Using ecash", 1997,
[on-line]). Like hard currency, ecash has its own intrinsic value.

Anonymity comes from the fact that it is extremely difficult to determine to whom a
currency certificate was issued, and under some models it is virtually impossible to do
so. However, because DigiCash keeps a database of spent certificates, if a user attempts
to spend the same certificate twice, they will surrender enough information to be
identified (Neuman & Medvinsky, ( 1995), [on-line]). This s<tme database provides the
information that can be used as proof of payment should disputes arise between payer
and payee.

The idea behind ecash is to provide people with a fl'r1~1 of e!ectronic currency that they
can use as they would normal hard currency. Withdrawal::; ·.from ecrJsh accounts are
password protected, and public key encryption (see Ch<!pter 3) is used whenever ecash
is transferred across the Internet. In addition, ecash can be stored on Smart cards,
allowing you to carry your electronic currency with you ("Money on the Internet", n.d.,

[on-line]).
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The ecash "Cyberbucks" trial was initiated in October 1994, and included over 100
merchants and 25,0CO users. A number of ecash licenses have been sold to banks. Such
licenses are non-exclusive. consequently allowing hanks to detennine their own
competitive pricing structure when issuing ecash. There are six banks that presently
issue ecash, including Australia's own Challenge Bank ( ..Current ecash Issuers and
Other Licensees", 1997, [on-line]).

The techniques used to keep track of certificates in order to stop double spending vary
between different electronic currency implementations. Some track currency certificates
that have been spent, while others track certificates which have been issued but not yet
spent. In either case, this massive overhead in terms of maintaining large databases is
one key disadvamage of electronic currency. Another is that users are forced to acquire
and maintain Internet bank accounts with currency servers (Neuman & Medvinsky,

( 1995), [on-line)).

2.3.5. NetChegue
NetCheque is a credit-debit system designed primarily by Clifford Neuman of the
Information Sciences Institute at the University of Southern California. NetCheque
certificates (cheques) contain similar information to paper cheques, and are designed to
work in a similar fashion. According to Mankin (1994), each cheque contains the name
of the payer, the name of the financial institution, the payer's account number, the name
of the payee and the amount of the check.

The:: cheques are signed by the payer using a digital signature, and must also be signed
by the payee before they can be cleared. This provides a means for the auditing of
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payments. Users of this system are re4uired to establish "cheque accounts" on
accounting servers (Neuman & Medvinsky, (1995), [on-line]). Once a cheque is
presented for payment, the payee's accounting server attaches its own endorsement
certificate and passes the cheque on to the issuing server. If this server is not registered
as a tnisted server, the cheque is passed to an intermediate trusted server, which then
attaches its own endorsement, ar.d su on. Once the cheque reaches the issuing server the
er..dorsemeus are used to channel the funds back to the payee's uccount.

According to Neuman & Medvinsky (1995), this clearing between servers allows
organisations to set up accounts in their own in-house accounting servers, with accounts
corresponding to budget lines. Authorised signers write cheques against these accounts,
while the organisation maintains a single account with an outside bank.

The NetCheque system is based on Kerberos (Neuman & Medvinsky, (1995), [on-line]).
a Data Encryption Standard (DES) based Authentication System. While Kerberos itself
is fairly widely used, it does have some limitations that make it unsuitable ns a sole
basis for secure Electronic Commerce on the Internet (Neuman & Ts'o, 1996, [on-line]).

2.3.6. CyberCash
According to CyberCash, Inc. ("CyberCash Overview", 1997, [on-line]), CyberCash
system cardholders are igsued with an electronic wallet in which they can store payment
card information. When the cardholder wishes to make a purchase, they click on the
card they want to use, and the details are transmitted accordingly. The wallet is
password protected, and all details transmitted across the Internet are strongly encrypted
using a combination secret key and public key encryption, a"> described in Chapter 3.
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All merchants who wish to accept CyberCash are screened for authenticity and
reliability before being allowed to do so, offering consumers some protection against
merchant fraud ( ..Acquiring lnternet Transactions", n.d., [on-line]).

In general terms, one of the advantages thal payment cards offer orer uiternate payment
methods is that there is no requirement for users to establish new financial accounts
online (Neuman & Medvinsky, 1995, [on-line]).

2.3.7. Areas of Concern
The barriers to the widespread acceptance of Electronic Commerce are many and varied.
Certainly one of the main areas of concern with the Internet as a whole is that of
security. Until fairly recently there were few real safeguards to ensure that
s~nt

me~-:;ages

across the Internet had not been intercepted, read, or alten:d whilst in transit.

("Why Do We Need Security in Cyberspace?", n.d., [on-line]).

The potential for fraud and deception on the Internet is fearsome. The Internet's
mussive connectivity and <~.vailability, combined with inexperienced or just lazy system
administration on many hosts, allows criminals to find and exploit weaknesses. When
information is sent over the Internet, there is usually no way for a user to know in
advance bow many or which other systems this infonnation might pass through on the
way. If even one of these systems is compromised, then the information may be at risk.
If a consumer's personal financial information were to fall into the hands of a criminal,
there would be little to stop that criminal from posing as the individual and using the
infonnation to make purchases through mail order, telephone order or any other non-

~E~d~it~h~C~o~w-a-n~U~n~i~ve~r=s~icy------------------------------~------------25

The Development and Use• of the Secure Elec:lronlc Tra~tion Protocol on the Internet

authenticated "face-to-face" ordering systems (Hoffman, Novak & Peralta, 1997, [on-

line]).

Although many variations exist, a typical retail electronic transaction could be described
as having the following steps (Computer Technology Research Corp., 1996, p. 137):

l. A consumer finds a merchant's site that contains goods of interest, and then

either browses the merchandise on display, or possibly downloads a catalogue
for viewing off-line. It should be mentioned that some merchants have begun
the practice of producing off-line catalogues that can be distributed to their
customers through standard channels, such as the postal system, which can then
be used to create order forms that are sent to their electronic shop. This is in
order to reduce bandwidth usage of their site, consequently reducing both the
load on their server, providing faster service, and reducing their own costs.

2. When the consumer finds goods or services they wish to purchase, they
download an order form, if they haven't already obtained one by other means
such as a catalogue. Once this form has been completed, including payment and
delivery details, it is then forwarded to the merchant for processing.

3. Once the merchant has ascertained that he/.'jhe can fill the order, they would
usually send a confirmation note back to the customer, and process the payment
information as per a standard Mail Orderrrelephone Order (MOTO) transaction.
The exact point at which the goods are dispatched varies with the merchant. but
for payment card transactions it would usually be immediately.
~~~~~~~---------------------------------26
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The security concerns that are nol:able in the process described above can be
summarised as follows:

1. How dor;s a consumer know that the supposed merchant is indeed a legitimate
vendor who:
;.. In reality, is who they say they are.

>-

Owns the goods for sale, and is authorised to sell them.

;;... Can accept the payment method they wish to use, and will not use it for
fraudulent purposes ut a later date.

2. How does a merchant know that the consumer is:

:r

Who they say they are.

}.- The legitimate holder/owner of the payment method used.

3. How does either pmty know that the messages sent and received have not been:

:r

Intercepted and read by a third party.

;o.. Altered in transit.

4. Additional problems include:
);>

Verification of the exchange.

As can be observed, striking a balance between allowing privacy of information, and
anonymity where required, while at the same time providing enough information to
authenticate the identities and authority of the parties involved, and to provide
verification of the transaction, is a significant problem.
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From the perspective of Internet businesses, one major concern is ease of use. No
matter what security techniques and payment meth 'ds are offered to assuage consumer
concerns regarding lack of security, they must be easy to use or they are unlikely to gain
widespread acceptance. The contlict between message security, authentication, privacy
and ease of use is probably the pivotal issue facing the world of Electronic Commerce.

There are many other technical issues relating to Electronic Commerce, which are of
concern to anyone who has a system connected to the Internet.

Thes~

concerns focus

primarily on restricting who and what has access to an organisations primary host, that
is, the server that acts as the connection between internal networks and the Internet
(Sheldon, 1997, p. 434 ).

Although secure payment gateways (intermediate financial servers) are an assumption in
most electronic payment schemes, the associated issues and implementation of such
servers are beyond the scope of this thesis. For more information on this topic Bruce &
Dempsey ( 1997), Cheswick & Beliovin ( 1994 ), POceger ( 1997), Stallings ( 1995), and
White, Fisch & Pooch ( 1996) are recommend by the author as good background
sources.
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3. Cryptography
The most practical way to protect information being sent over an open network like the
Internet is to use cryptographic techniques to encrypt messages. These techniques
render the information contained therein unusable to anyone except the intended
recipient, or possibly an extremely sophisticated adversary.

Cryptography is the science of sending messages in a coded format. The word itself
stems from the Latin kryptos, meaning "hidden", and graplws, meaning "writing".
When we take an ordinary message, usually called plaimext or cleartext, and encrypt it,
we convert it into what appears to be gibberish to the untrained eye. This encrypted
version of the original message is usually called ciphertext or u cryptogram. The
mathematical formula or rules that allow a person to switch back and forth from
cleartext to ciphertext and vice versa are called a cipher or an algorithm (Bacard, 1995,

p. 70).

The objective of cryptography is to enable two people to communicate over a potentially
insecure channel in such a way thnt an opponent who intercepts the message cannot
understand what is being said (Stinson, 1995, p. l ). According to Bacard ( 1995),
strictly speaking, any fonn of communication that is not commonly used or understood
can be considered a fonn of cryptography. He points out that historically the use of
alternate forms of language is a good example of this. Ancient Egypt had two distinct
and well~defined languages, the hieratic, known only to the priesthood, and the demotic,
used by everyone else. Similarly, there are records of the ancient Greeks developing
forms of shorthand. Indeed, for nearly a thousand years after the life of Christ, the
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ruling elite of Europe communicated in Latin, a purely scholarly language at the time.
Modern c1yptogruphics can be viewed as a language composed of mathematical
formulas of such complexity that only the highly skilled, aided by modern technology,
have any reasonable chance of interpreting.

Modern encryption techniques ensure greater security through the use of a unique key
(Schneier, 1994, p. 130). A key can be any value that can be represented in the key
length used, i.e. the number of bits used to represent the key. The key is used in
combination with the encryption algorithm to encrypt plaintext messages.
Fundamentally, the longer the key is, the more complex it is to decrypt the ciphertext
message without it, purticuhu·ly using a "brute force" attack (Pfleeger, 1997, p. 113).

Encryption can be used to foil most attempts at compromising message security. If
criminals cannot decrypt a message, then it is safe from being read or modified, even if
it is intercepted. According to Pfleeger ( 1997), many encryption algorithms are

practically unbreakable, and so are considered to be secure. This means tiJat the time
and resources required to break the key would be of more value than the data recovered,
or that the data would no longer have intrinsic value after such time had passed. Many
of these secure methods are in use today. However, as computers become faster, and
with commensurate increases in connectivity, parallelism and the sophistication of
cryptanalysis attacks, the length of key needed to maintain security is constantly
increa~ing.
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3.1. Conventional Encryption
Often called single key, secret key or symmetric encryption, conventional encryption is
the most common and widely used form of encryption today (Alexander, 1996, p. 136).
With this methm.!, a plaintext message is encoded using an encryption algorithm and a
key to produce a ciphertext message. Once the message reaches its destination, it is
decoded using a decryption algorithm and the same key in order to retrieve the origim.li
plaintext message.

The most widely used conventional encryption algorithm is the Data Encryption
Standard (DES) developed by IBM, and accepted by the US Federal Bureau of
Standards in 1977 (Massey, 1992, p. 2). DES employs a combination of the traditional
cryptographic methods of substitution, exchanging one symbol for another, and
transposition, rearranging symbol positions. Individually these methods would be
considered "weak" by modern cryptographic standards, but DES combines them in such
a way that results in over 70 quadrillion possible transformation functions, making it

very effective (Smid & Branstad, 1992, p. 54).

The biggest problem with this form of encryption is key management (Schneier, 1994,
p. 140). Before the sender and receiver can exchange messages, somehow the key must
first be transmitted between them. No matter how this is achieved, whether by phone,
mail, fax or some other method, there is usually still a danger of interception. This is a
large enough problem on a one to one basis, but consider the problem when there are
hundreds, or even thousands of users who need to communicate in this m:mner. If even
·one copy of the key is compromised, then all communications amongst this user group
are suddenly vulnerable.
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3.2. Public Key Encryption
A second form of encryption, known as public key or asymmetrical encryption, offers a
solution to the problem of key distribution (Stinson, 1995, p. 114). With this method,
each user has a pair of mathematically related keys, each of which can be used to
decrypt what the other has encrypted. One of the keys is kept as the owners' private
key, which is kept secret, while the other, the public key, can be freely distributed to as

many other users as desired. When a user wunts to send a message to the owner of the
key pair, they encrypt it using the public key, secure in the knowledge that the only key
that will be able to decrypt the message is the corresponding private key owned by the
intended recipient.

Obviously, this only provides secure communication in one direction. In order for a
message to travel in the opposite direction the same process must be performed in
reverse, thus requiring a second set of keys.

The most noticeable shortcoming of public key encryption is that because it is
computationally expensive, it is significantly slower than conventional encryption (Till,

1997, [on-line]).

Diftie and Hellman ( 1976: a, b) were the first to reveal this method of encryption.
However, it was in 1978 that Rivest, Shamir and Adleman developed the first concrete
example of public key encryption (Davies & Price, 1989, p. 212), commonly called
RSA after its creators. According to Schneier (1994), the RSA algorithm gets its
security from the difficulty of factoring large numbers.
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3.3. Specialised Techniques
The problem of being able to confidently associate a message with its suppo!,ed
originator is a significant one for Electronic Commerce. In traditional face-to-face
transat:tions, using a payment card for arguments sake, a merchant could always check
that the card being used belonged to the person using it by comparing the signature
given to the one on the back of the card. Obviously this is not possible when the
transaction is an electronic one. So what's to stop a crimiD<Il in possession of someone
else's payment card details pretending to be that person and purchasing goods? This
type of fraud has had a significant impact on the popularity of Electronic Commerce to
date, and is generally referred to as "spooling".

The use of public key cryptography, in combination with digital signatures and digital
certificates, discussed in Sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 respectively, provides authentication
of messages and the individuals involved in electronic transactions.

3.3.1. Digital Signatures and Message Digests
Assuming that it is possible for a sufficiently powerful or well informed adversary to
intercept, decrypt, alter, and then re-encrypted a messagl! while it is in transit between a
sender and receiver, the receiver needs some method of ascertaining that the message
received is in its original form. This can be achieved through the use ot message digests
and digital signatures.

A sender can generate a message digest of the original plaint(!xt message or document
by passing it through a one-way cryptographic hash function,

i.~".

one that cannot be

reversed. When the message digest itself is encrypted using the sender's private key,
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this is known as the digital signature of the message. This is then appended to the
original message before transmission. The recipient of the message decrypts the digital
signature and retrieves the message digest using the sender's public key, then generates
the message digest of the plaintext message or document received using the public
cryptographk hash function, and compares the two message digests for discrepancies.
If there are no discrepancies, then the recipient knows that the message received is the
one that was originally sent. The use of the sender's private key to encrypt the message
digest provides proof of the origin of the digest, which in turn provides proof of the
origin of the message itself (Ford & Baum, 1997, p. 112).

Figure 1. Message DiHests and Digital Signatures
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Of course, it should be noted that digital signatures by themselves do not guarantee nonrepudiation. If a user's private key is conveniently "exposed" to the public, they can
deny the authenticity of a particular message. Timestamps can partially help solve this
problem by proving that a message was sent at a certain point in time, but this is hardly
conclusive evidence of fraud. This problem has caused much discussion about the
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possibility of sealing private keys in "tamper-resistant" modules, to stop such
"accidental" exposure (Schneier, 1994. p. 36}.

The message digest for any given message is unique. It is computationally infeasible for
the same message digest to be generated by two different messages. as changing even a
single bit in the original message will alter approximately half the bits in the resulting
message digest. SHA is probably the most common hash function algorithm used to
generate these digests as it is the primary hash function associated with tbe DSA (Ford
& Baum, 1997. p. 221). See Section 3.3.2 for more infonnation on the DSA.

Apart from the ability of cryptographic hash functions to provide authentication of the
content and origin of messages, perhaps their most useful feature is that they generate a
message digest of a predetermined size, regardless of the length of the original message
or document. Message digests are only 160 bits in length if the Digital Signature
Standard is used. which makes them a highly efficient way of signing lengthy messages
(Ford, 1994, p. 84).

3.3.2. The Digital Signature Standard (DSS)
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) proposed the Digital
Signature Standard (DSS} in August 1991. According to the Federal Register (cited in
Schneier, 1994, p. 304):

"A Federal Jnfonnation Processing Standard (FIPS) for Digital Signature
Standard (DSS) .... specifies a public-key digital signature algorithm (DSA)
appropriate for Federal digital signature applications .... considered during this
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process were the Icvel of security provided, the ease of implementation ... the
ease of expmt from the U.S., the applicability of patents, impact on national
security and law enforcement and the level of efficiency in both the signing and
verification functions."

Despite a torrent of criticism and litigation, the DSS was eventually adopted as the
federal standard for authenticating electronic documents on May 191h, 1994 ("What are
DSA and DSS?", 1996, [on-line]) ("Digital Signatures", n.d., [on-line]).

3.3.3. Digital Certificates
Although digital signatures do provide a way to verify that a message has not been
tampered with since it was originally encrypted and sent, it still doesn't provide
foolproof prevention of spoofing (Schneier, 1994, p. 36).

Before two parties can transact business electronically, they must be able to authenticate
each other's identity. Before a merchant accepts a message from a consumer, they must
be sure that ·lhe sender is who they say they are, and not an imposter using their own key
pair. This requires that when the receiver obtains the senders public key, they must be
able to confirm that the key belongs to the individual stated. This comes back then to
the problem of secure key distribution. The option whereby the receiver obtains the
senders public key in some other manner, e.g. registered mail, is not usually a practical
solution between parties who may only interact once. The preferr~d method is to
provide both the public key and some form of authentication by a trusted third party
within the message itself (Ford & Baum, 1997, p. 193).
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These trusted third pmties are usually known as Certificate Authorities (CA). Once a
CA has established the identity of an individual to their satisfaction, which is usually a
fairly stringent process, they create a message that usually contains the individuals name
and details, and their public key(s). This message is known as a digital certificate, and
is signed with theCA's private key, meaning that it can be checked for authenticity by
anyone using theCA's public key. Thus by including his or her digital certificate as
part of an overall rnessagl! a sender can simultaneously achieve authentication and

key~

exchange, i.e. provide proof of the identity and ownership of the public key (Ford &
Baum, 1997, p. 194).

Figure 2. Digital Certification
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To get the maximum benefit from this scheme, it is desirable for as many people as
possible to know theCA's public key. The more people who have access to this key,
the greater the possible usage of the associated certificate. According to the SET
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Business Descriptiou ( 1997), this allows for hierarchy with a high degree of trust, based
on a single key (see Section 5.5).

3.3.4. Digital Envelopes
Usually, once a'.i the various components of a message have been prepared, i.e. the
actual plaintext message or document to be sent, the digital signature of the message or
document, and the sender's digital certificate, the entire package is encrypted using
conventional encryption prior to transmission. The symmetric key used for this is then
encrypted using the receiver's public key and appended to the message. This encrypted
key is called the digital envelope. This means that only the intended recipient can use
their private key to "ope·n" the digital envelope and obtain the symmetrical key to
decrypt the rest of the message (SET Business Description, 1997, p. 21 ).

Figure 3. Digital Envelopes
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3.4. Legal Issues
Despite the obvious usefulness of cryptography, many governments have grave concerns
about the proliferation of such techniques when usee! in conjunction with the power of
computers. In some countries this lead to cryptography and other dual-use technologies
originally being classified in the same category as arms and other munitions for the
purposes of import and export (Computer Technology Research Corp., 1996, p. 72).

The real difficulty lies in the fact that the Internet has largely broken down national
boundaries. It is extremely difficult for countries to control the import and export of
information in electronic form, and even if they do, the question of jurisdiction then
raises it ugly head. The problems associated with crimes, or even misdirected
transactions, which cross national boundaries are already well known (Watson, 1997, p.

52).

For the most part, officially, countries are concerned that if the use of "strong"
cryptography becomes widespread, they will not be ahle to intercept or monitor
electronic traffic concerning criminal activities. Of course, privacy activists are
concerned that governments won't stop with known criminals, but will routinely monitor
other traffic as well (Wisebrod, 1997, [on-line]).

One compromise solution to this problem is key escrow. This involves all
cryptographic keys being kept m trust by a trusted third party. This would work in
much the same way as wiretaps do. That is, if a government suspect someone of
transmitting information associated with illegal activities, they can get a court order to
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have the necessary key(s) released to allow them to monitor the transmissions.
However, each time this method has been proposed, whether on a mandatory or
voluntary basis, it has been rejected due to its perceived flaws and weaknesses
(Abelson, Anderson, Bellovin, Benaloh, Blaze, Diffie, Gilmore, Neumann, Rivest,
Schiller & Schneier, 1997, [on-line]).

Amongst others, these problems have lead to a number of international treaties that
address this issue. Perhaps the most significant of these is the "Wassenaar Arrangement
on Export Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies"
(Broiles, 1997, [on-line]), which was ratified in July 1996, and was ultimately signed by
33 countries. Other significant organisations that have been working to develop
guidelines include the European Union (EU), the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the International Chamber of Commerce
(ICC) (Koops, 1997, [on-line]).

3.4.1. Pertinent U.S. Legal Issues
As SET is being developed in the USA, and a large number of the companies initially
proposing to develop SET compliant software are also in the USA, it is primarily this
country's legislation that impacts upon its initial proliferation.

Control over the export of cryptography from the US was shifted from the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) to the Export Administration Regulations (EAR) of
the Department of Commerce at the end of 1996. This has resulted in a loosening of the
export regulations where specific conditions applj'. According to Koops (1997), the
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new export rules distinguish between five categories of "encryption items" (EI) as
follows:

1. Certain mass-market encryption software may be released from EI controls after
a one-time review.

2. "Data recovery" crypto [cryptography] (meaning that government can access
keys or plaintext with a lawful warrant) will be eligible for an export license to
non-embargoed countries [embargoed countries currently include: Cuba, Iran,
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan].

3. After a one-time review, (up to) 56-bit cryptogmphy can be granted a six-month
export license, provided the exporting business commits itself to incorporating a
data recovery feature in its products within the next two years. This relaxation of
controls will last until January 1, 1999: after two years, the export of nonrecovery 56-bit cryptography will be prohibited again, and the same situation as
before will hold (maximum 40-bit key length, with exceptions for financial
institutions).

4. All other encryption items may be eligible for encryption licensing
arrangements; items not authorized under a licensing arrangement will be
considered on a case-by-case basis.

5. Encryption "technology" may be licensed for export on a case-by-case basis.
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The US Department of Justice is also involved in the "case-by-case" decisions regarding
export licenses.

The SET Business Description ( 1997) assures us that despite the restrictive regulations
enforced by many nations concerning the import or export of cryptography, as a general
rule these governments allow cryptography to be used when:

:r

The data being encrypted is of a financial nature;

~

The content of the data is well-defined;

~

The length of the data is limited; and

).;- The cryptography cannot easily be used for other purposes.

This is supported by the above summary of the EAR. With the gradual relaxing of
export restrictions in regard to financial applications, it is apparent that even the
governments acknowledge that Electronic Commerce can only flourish if the necessary
software can be exported from the country of its origin.
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4. The Current Defacto Standard
Although there are a number of secure transaction protocols currently vying for the title
of Internet Standard, perhaps the most widely recognised of these is Netscape's Secure
Sockets Layer (SSL). The SSL protocol is designed to provide a transport layer
encryption scheme. The Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) is currently reviewing
the Internet Draft form of SSL version 3.0 to determine its suitability as such a standard.
Of course in the final analysis, the key factor in determining whether or not something
becomes a "standard" on the Internet is market consensus. If a product doesn't have
support from both developers and users, then it is surely doomed to ultimate
obsolescence. The current version of SSL, SSL version 2.0, already has the support of
many of the industries major players, including IBM, Microsoft, and even Spyglass
(PompilL 1996, [on-line]), and many major developers now include support for SSL in
their current applications.

This chapter provides a summary of the key security procedures and methods used by
the SSL protocol to provide secure session connections between communicating parties.

4.1. Secure Sockets Layer {SSL)
SSL can be used to secure nearly everything that's tmnsmitted between a browser and a
server, from passwords and logon IDs to files being downloaded from an FfP server
(Pornpi!i, 1996, [on-line]).
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According to Freier, Karlton & Kocher (1996), apart from the primary goal of providing
privacy and reliability between communicating applications, the goals of SSL Protocol,
in order of their priority, are:

I. Cryptographic security - SSL should be used to establish a secure connection
between two parties.

2. Interoperability- Independent programmers should be able to develop applications
utilising SSL 3.0 that will then be able to successfully exchange cryptographic
parameters without knowledge of one another's code. However, it is not the case
that all instances of SSL (even in the same application domain) will be able to
successfully connect. For instance, if the server supports a particular hardware
token, and thl! client does not have access to such a token, then the connection will
not succeed.

3. Extensibility - SSL seeks to provide a framework into which new public key tmd
bulk encryption methods can be incorporated as necessary. This will accomplish
two sub-goals: to prevent the need to create a new protocol (and risking the
introduction of possible new weaknesses) and to avoid the need to implement an
entire new security library.

4. Relative efficiency- Cryptographic operations tend to be highly CPU intensive,
particularly public key operations. For this reason, the SSL protocol has
incorporated an optional session caching scheme to reduce the number of
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connections that need to be established from scratch. Additionally. care has been
taken to reduce net\/ork activity.

The SSL protocol is comprised of two basic layers; the SSL Record Protocol. which sits
at the lowest level acting as an intermediary between the transport protocol, e.g. TCP/IP,
and the higher level protocols themselves, like the Handshake Protocol. The SSL
Record Protocol is used for encapsulation of the various higher level protocols. This
allows SSL to provide a transparent security layer between the network itself, and a
variety of network s0rvice protocols such as Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP),
Tel net. Network News Transfer Protocol (NNTP), and File Transfer Protocol (FTP)

("Secure Sockets Layer", 1997, [on-line]).

4.1.1, SSL Connections
According to Freier, Karlton & Kocher ( 1996), the SSL Handshake Protocol is designed
to allow a server and a client to authenticate each other, and to negotiate cryptographic
details such as algorithm, Machine Access Code (MAC) secrets, and keys before any
data is exchanged between applications. This provides connection security that has
three basic properties:

I. The connection is private. Encryption is used after an initial handshake to define
a secret key. Symmetric cryptography is used for [bulk] data encryption (e.g.

Data Encryption Standard, etc. (See Chapter 3))

2. The peer's identity can be authenticated using public key cryptography (e.g.

RSA, DSS, etc. (See Chapter 3)).
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3. The connection is reliable. Message transport includes a message integrity

check using u keyed MAC. Secure hash functions (e.g. SHA, MDS, etc. (See
Chapter 3)) are used for MAC computations.

SSL takes the data to be transmitted, breaks it into manageable blocks of a
predetennined size, then generates a MAC for each block, and encrypts and transmits
each block and MAC together. Data blocks that are smaller than the agreed size are
padded with some regular pattern, usually all zeros. Before the MAC is calculated, SSL
also provides the option of compressing the da1a. Consequently, when the data is
received at the other end, it is decrypted, verified, decompressed if necessary, and then
reassembled.

4.1.2. Client/Server Authentication
Client and server authentication is optional in SSL. When a client initiates
communication with a server, the initial message exchange is used to establish some m·
all of the following:

,. The SSL protocol version,
,. A unique Session ID,
,. The cryptographic suite to be used, and
}oo

The compression method.

In the initial response from the server, it may supply a certificate to provide
authentication, and likewise it may request one in return. These certificates can be
digitally signed if required. It' an appropriate certificate is not available, the server will
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respond by initiating a public key exchange with the client. The client responds using
the new key(s) and algorithms to establish the final parameters for the session.

Once the client wtd server have exchanged public and secret keys, and established a
secure connection, they can begin exchanging data using the agreed upon methods.

4.1.3. Message Authentication
SSL uses a Message Authentication Code (MAC) to verify the integrity of messages. A
MAC is basically a message digest, as described in Section 3.3.1. Although SSL can
make use of a number of pos~.;ible hashing algorithms including SHA and MD5, it is
most likely that SHA would be used predominantly, as it is generally considered
stronger than most others, and generates a 160 bit digest (Ford, 1994, p. 84), making it
compatible with the Digital Signature A.lgorithm (DSA).
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4.2. Summary
This Chapter describes the SSL security protocol, the current defacto standard for the
Internet. As was observed at the beginning, SSL has much backing from major
companies involved with Internet development, which means that it is likely to maintain
a significant presence for the foreseeable future at least. When used to full effect it
fulfils its objectives of privacy and authenticity through the use of encryption and digital
certificates (Reid, 1996, p. 667). However, a number of obstacles exist that must be
overcome if SSL is to receive universal acceptance as an industry standard (Reid.. 1991),
p. 667). One such problem is the difficulty in exporting software that employs sur;h a
generic encryption scheme from the US, due to that countries restrictive policy on such
export.

Chapter 5 introduces the SET protocol, which is currently vying with SSL for
widespread acceptance as the standard security protocol for Electronic Commerce.
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5. Secure Electronic Transaction (SET) !Protocol
In order to maintain as much accuracy as possible, the information in this chapter is
sourced almost exclusively from the SET Business Description (1997).

5.1. Introduction
The SET specification defines protocols that are aimed at providing authentication for
all parties involved in an electronic transaction, while at the same time ensuring the
integrity and confidentiality of all information transmitted.

It seems obvious that most payment card brands should have a vested interest in

suppot1ing the development of secure transaction standards for a number of reasons.
The de-velopment of an appropriate standard, during what is effectively the infancy of
Electronic Commerce, will probably save great expense and difficulty later by avoiding
having to reconcile different systems that may have been developed otherwise.
Additionally, such standards will help preserve the integrity of all patties involved in
such transactions, which should increase consumer confidence in privacy and security,
decrease the amount of payment card fraud, and generally accelerate the growth of a
potentially huge marketplace.

The SET specifications have been carefully designed to ensure that they possess the
maximum appeal for software vendors, financial institutions and consumers alike. This
has been achieved in a

n~Jmber

of ways. While the SET protocols define an open

payment card standard, based on existing standards where possible, it is also
documented in a manner that will allow software vendors to develop globally
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interoperative software, which can be implemented across many different combinations
of hardware and software. SET implementations will "bolt-on" to existing client
applications, minimising the impact that they will have on the current commercial
systems and infrastructure. One of the key aims of SET, designed to gain it the support
of the financial sector, is to provide an efficient set of protocols for acquirers and cardissuing banks. In short, SET is designed to be easy for everyone to use and/or
implement, while causing minimal disruption to current systems in the process.

At present, vendors who develop SET compliant applications must submit them to
independent testing by Tenth~Mountain-Systems, Inc .. However, these tests only certify
compliance against the SET Draft Reference Implementation version 0.0. This is a
temporary measure until a long~term SET Olmpliance Authority (SCA) can be set up to
test compliance with version 1.0 ("Compliance.", 1997, [on-line]).

The key requirements of the SET protC1Cols, as defined within the SET specification
documents, are as follows:

);>

Provide confidentiality of payment information and enable confidentiality of
order information that is transmitted along with the payment information.

;.;,. Ensure the integrity of all transmitted data.

l> Provide authentication that a cardholder is a legitimate user of a branded
payment card account.
)">

Provide authentication that a merchant can accept branded payment card
transactions through its relationship with an acquiring financial institution.
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~

Ensure the use of the best security practices and system design techniques to
protect ail legitimate parties in an Electronic Commerce transaction.

~

Create a protocol that neither depends on transport security mechanisms nor
prevents their use.

~

Facilitate and encourage interoperability among software and network providers.

The following discussion broadly outlines the key issues.

5.1.1. Confidentiality of lnformatioQ
In order for Electronic Commerce using payment card products to be a success,
cardholders must be confident that all information that they commit to

s~1ch

transactions

will be completely secure during transmission, and will only be recoverable by the
intended recipient. The SET protocols achieve this through the use of message
encryption, using a combination of conventional (DES) and public-key (RSA)
enc1yption (See Chapter 3).

5.1.2. Integrity of Data
Data that is transmitted must be guaranteed against deliberate or accidental alteration
whilst in transit. The integrity of all information transmitted using SET is validated
through the use of digital signatures.

In most cases, the SET specifications require that the primary participants in a
transaction have two pairs of keys, a "signature" pair, used for the creation of digital
signatures, and a "key-exchange" pair, used for general encryption/decryption purposes
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(See Chapter 3). The exception to this rule is the cardholder, who under nonnal
conditions does not necessarily require a key~exchange pair (see Section 5.4).

5.1.3. Cardholder Account and Merchant Authentication
Because of the anonymous nature of Electronic Commerce, cardholders and merchants
cannot physically identify those with whom they are dealing. There is a requirement for
some method by which all parties can give proof of identity. Merchants must be assured
that an individual trying to make a purchase is the legal holder of the card being used.
Like\vise, cardholders want assurance that the business they are about to make payment
to is a valid merchant.

SET uses a combination of Cardholder Certificates and Merchant Certificates to achieve
such identification, and to provide

non~repudiation

(See Section 3.3.3).

5.1.4. lnteroperability
The SET specifications have ensured that they support a wide range of hardware and
software platforms through the use of specific proto<..vls and message formats. This
means that there will be no requirement for cardholders and merchants to use the same
hardware and software platforms, beyond the obvious requirement that all software will
need to be compliant with the SET standard.

5.2. Participants
Electronic Commerce on the Internet using payment cards involves the traditional
participants, being the card~issuing institution, Acquirer, cardholder and merchant, but
can also involve payment gateways and third parties. This Section describes these
tenns, and their significance in SET transactions.
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5.2.1. Issuers

Payment card issuing institutions (Issuers) guarantee payment for authorised
transactions using their products. This is dependent on the product being used in
accordance with both the agreed terms and conditions, and with domestic legislation.
Although the Issuer is responsible for all debts if a cardholder uses credit and then
cannot or will not pay back the moneys owed, in the case of disputed transactions the
onus of proof often falls squarely on the merchant (Till, 1997, [on-line}).

5.2.2. Acguirers
Acquirers are the financial institutions that process payment card transactions for the
merchants. The acquirer purchases the credit transaction from the merchant,
immediately crediting the merchants account for the amount of the transaction minus
the discount. The discount is a combination of the charge that the Issuer will deduct
from the transaction for processing, known as interchange reimbursement fees, plus the
Acquirers own percentage profit (Till, 1997, [on-line]).

5.2.3. Cardholders
For the purpose of Electronic Commerce, a cardholder can include any individual or
organisation that has been issued a payment card of any type by an Issuer. SET does not
differentiate between card types, or transaction types, as it acts purely as a "front-end" to
such transactions.

5.2.4. Brands
There are a number of different types of payment cards available today. Financial
institutions like banks offer a variety of credit and debit card products. Other
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institutions that provide financial services often offer their own unique products, which
they promote themselves, e.g. retail chain cards, like Australia's MyerCard. In the case
of thes~ types of products, the Issuer often also acts as the Acquirer for relevant
uansactions.

5.2.5. Merchants
As with more mundane forms of commerce, a merchant on the Internet offers to sell or
provide goods and/or services. An Internet merchant who accepts payment cards of any
type must have a relationship with an Acquirer who can process such payments.
Transactions of this type have been deemed to fall into the same category as Mail Order/
Telephone Order (MOTO) transactions, making them far more expensive for merchants

to process than EFfPOS (Till, 1997, [on-line]).

5.2.6. Pavrnent Gateways
According to the SET Business Description ( 1997), "A payment gateway is a device
operated by an Acquirer or a designated third party that processes merchant payment
messages, including payment instructions from cardholders." Obviously, because such
gateways are designated to handle sensitive financial data, and therefore must be known
to be trustworthy, they must be certified like all other parties.

5.2.7. Third Parties
Third parties may sometimes be nominated by Issuers and Acquirers to handle the
processing of payment card transactions. However, as this does not change the
functionality of such transactions, SET does not differentiate between these processors.
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Q,3. Scope
Although the entire Internet shopping experience begins at the point where a consumer
first becomes aware of a merchant of interest to him/her. the SET specifications are only
concerned with the transaction from the point at which financial information begins to
be exchanged. SET is designed to protect such information while it is being used in the
tripartite relationship between the cardholder, the merchant, and the Acquirer. This
covers a number of steps including; the cardholder sending an order, complete with
payment details, the merchant requesting and receiving payment authorisation from the
Acquirer. and then sending an order confirmation back to the cardholder.

The SET Business Description (1997) identifies the following lists pertaining to the
overall scope of the SET specifications.

Within the scope:
l> Application of cryptographic algorithms (such us RSA and DES)

}- Certificate message and object formats

>

Purchase messages and object formats

)

Authorization messages and object formats

>

Capture messages and object formats

>

Message protocols between participants
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Outside the scope:
)>

Message protocols for offers, shopping, delivery of goods, etc.

)>

Operational issues such as the criteria set by individual financial institutions for
the issuance of cardholder and merchant certificates

)>

Screen formats including the content, presentation and layout of order entry
fonns as defined by each merchant

)>

General payments beyond lhe domain of payment cards

)>

Security of data on cardholder, merchant, and payment gateway systems
including protection from viruses, Trojan horse programs, and hackers

)>

The means by which financial institutions authenticate cardholders and
merchants

It should be noted that this is only a partial list of categories of things that are outside
the scope of the SET specification.
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5.4. Encryption
The following diagram illustrates the complete encryption process used by the SET
specifications for the transmission of a secure message between a sender (Alice) and
receiver (Bob).

Figure 4. SET Encryption Summary
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(SET Buslness Description, 1997, p. 20)
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The steps involved in this process can be summarised as follows:

l. The message digest of the document to be sent is computed using a public one-way
cryptographic hash function.

2. Alice then signs the message digest with her private signature key in order to create
the digital signature of the document.

3. The document to be sent, the digital signature, and Alice's signature certificate,
containing her public signature key, are all encrypted using a randomly generated
symmetric session key to form the final message.

4. The symmetric session key is then encrypted using Bob's public key~ . .·xchange key,
obtained from his key~excha1lge certificate, to form the digital envelope.

5. The encrypted message and the digital envelope are then both sent to Bob.

6. Bob decrypts the digital envelope using his private key~exchange key in order to
retrieve the session key.

7. The session key is then used to decrypt the message.
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8. The digital signature contained in the message is decrypted using Alice's public

signature key, obtained from her signature certificate, to obtain the original message
digest.

9. The same public one-way cryptographic hash function is used to generate a new

message digest of the actual document received.

10. Bob then compares the original message digest to the new message digest. If they
are identical then the message has not been altered since it was first sent.

This process clearly illustrates the need for each participant to have key/certificate sets
for both key-exchange and the creation of digital signatures.

5.4.1. Dual Signatures
Dual signatures are a new application of digital signatures introduced in the SET
specification. The concept evolved from the need to protect information from different
parties in a given transaction. For example, if Alice wanted to make an offer to
purchase some goods from Bob, she would send him the offer and the payment
authorisation for use if the offer is accepted. Obviously, Alice only wants the funds
transferred if the offer is accepted. Furthermore, Alice doesn't want the bank to see the
tenns of the offer, and she doesn't want Bob to see her payment information. All of this
can be achieved by linking the offer and the payment details with a dual signature.

Computing the message digests of each separate message, in this case the offer and the
payment infonnation, concatenating the two digests and then computing the message
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digest of the result and signing it with the sender's private signature key generates a dual
signature. This dual signature., along with the message digest of both messages is
included in each message to allow verification.

Figure 5. Dual Signatures
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For example, Bob's message would include the offer, the message digest of the offer,
the message digest of the puyment information, and the dual signature. The offer itself
can be authenticated as was described in the previous section. If Bob concatenates the
message digest of the offer received and the message digest of the payment infonnation,
then generates the message digest of the result, he can compare that against the
decrypted dual signature to verify its authenticity. Once Bob notifies the bank of his
acceptance of the offer, such notification including a message digest (/.lhe o-l'f~~r being
accepted, the bank can verify its message in the same manner, thus ensuring that the
offer being accepted is the one that Alice authorised payment for. Neither Bob nor the
bank gets to see the details sent to the other.
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SET uses dual signatures to link orders sent to merchants with payment information
destined for the merchants Acquirer. When a merchant requests authorisation for
payment, the message to the Acquirer includes the encrypted payment information
received from the cardholder, and the message digest of the order received, thus
allowing the Acquirer to verify the dual signature.

The one key difference between a standard message to a merchant, and payment
information destined for the Acquirer, is that the payment information itself is actually
included in the digital envelope, encrypted with the Acquirer's public key-exchange key.
This provides payment information with the additional protection of public key
cryptography.

Figure 6. SET Payment Information
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5.4.2. Export Issues
Because the SET protocols are only concemr.d with the "shopping" side of Electronic
Commerce, and have clearly defined the use of encryption to financial transactions of
this nature only, many of the concerns of governments regarding the export of
technology that utilises encryption have been alleviated. Despite the difficulties
associated with the export of this type of technology, the SET Business Descriptior.
(1997) assures us that providing software vendors planning to use the SET protocols can
demonstrate that the cryptcgraphy used can not be easily put tu ....her purposes, export
licenses should be obtainable.

Of course this is yet to be put to the test in many of the nations hostile to the use of

c1yptography.

5.5. Certificates
As was discussed above, digital certificates are used to significantly strengthen
authentication procedures. In addition to the standard information contained in digital
certificates, SET certificates also provide information specific to electronic payment
card transactions. Each participant requires a certificate appropriate to the role that they
play in such transactions, i.e. cardholder, merchant, Acquirer, etc. This requires that a
number of separate CAs are used to issue these certificates, each having a specialisation
in one of the required areas. The "hierarchy of trust" that SET uses for certificate
issuance is described in Section 5.5.1.
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According to Till (1997), the system for issuing digital certificates under the SET
regime may take some time to establish. In the interim it is likely !hat banks will make
use of existing private CA's like VeriSign and GTE CyberTrust.

It should be noted that because most SET transaction participants require both keyexchange and signature key pairs, they also require two digital certificates in order to
authenticate both sets. TheCA can create both of these certificates at the same time.

5.5.1. Hierarchy of Trust
According to the SET Business Description (1997):

"SET certificates are verified through a hierarchy oftmst. Each certificate is
linked to the signature ce1tificate of the entity that digitally signed it. By
following the trust tree to a known trusted party, one can be assured

th~.t

the

certificate is valid. For example, a cardholder certificate is linked to the
certificate of the Issuer (or the Brand on behalf of the Issuer). The Issuer's
certificate is linked back to a root key through the Brand's certificate. The
public signature key of the root is known to all SET software and may be used to
verify each of the certificates in turn."

The following diagram illustrates one possible hierarchy of trust, but this may be altered
in a number of ways. For example, each payment card brand may not necessarily
operate a Geopolitical Certificate Authority (GCA), which is merely an optional
intermediate national CA for each country or political region, between itself and the
other various Certificate Authorities.
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Figure 7. SET Hierarchy of Trust
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The "ribbons" in the above diagram indicate which Certificate Authority signed each
certificate.

5.5.2. Cardholder Certificates
SET cardholder certificates are the electronic equivalent of an actual payment card.
These certificates are signed by a financial institution, and consequently can only be
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issued by a financial institution. Such certificates are only issued with the approval of
the cardholdet"s Issuer.

Cardholder certificates do not actually contain the payment card account information,
but rather are the equivalent of a message digest created by running both the account
information and a secret value through a one-way cryptographic hash function. This
secret value is known only to the cardholder's software, and is included with the
encrypted payment information. If the account information, i.e. card number, expiry
date, etc., and the secret value are known, then the lmk to the certificate can be proven.
In a normal transaction, the cardholder certificate is transmitted to merchants with
purchase requests and encrypted payment details. This is then passed along to the
Payment Gateway or Acquirer to provide proof of ownership of the card by the
cardholder. A merchant can observe none of this information by looking at the
certificate, but can be assured at least that if the Acquirer confirms payment then the
link has been verified.

When a cardholder applies for a certificate they are indicating their intention to
participate in this type of Electronic Commerce. Under the current specification Issuers
are under no obligation to grant the certificate application. Indeed, in version 1.0 of the
SET specifications, it is not even a requirement that Issuers use cardholder certificates at
all, although failure to do so would significantly weaken the SET authentication
process. The reason behind this optional exclusion appears to be in order to allow
vendors to initially develop SET compliant software without the requirement of an
existing SET compliant certificate authority hierarchy.
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5.5.3. Merchant Certificates
Merchant certificates indicate to consumers that they are authorised by an Acquirer to
accept payment cards of a particular brand. Merchants must have a separate set of
certificates for each brand of payment card, as each certificate originates from the
Payment Brand CA in the SET "hierarchy of trust".

Like cardholder certificates, because merchant certificates are signed by the merchant's
financial institution, they can only be issued by a financial institution, and cannot be

alter by a third party.
5.5.4. Gateway CertiliG<.l!<1s.
Because Arquirers or their designated Payment Gateways are trusted to process the
cardholder's payment details, they have to be certified by the cardholder's payment
brand. These certificates authorise the Payment Gateway to process payment
authorisations, the request from a merchant for authorisation of an individual
transacl:ion, and capture messages, the request from a merchant for payment.

The cardholder receives a copy of this certificate in order to obtain the public key
necessary to encrypt their payment details, such that nobody other than the Acquirer or
Payment Gateway can access them.

5.5.5. Acquirer Certificates
Like all participants in a SET transaction, Acquirers must be certified. However,
Acquirers who also wish to be Certificate Authorities, i.e. issue certificates to merchants
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on behalf of a particular payment card brand, must in turn be certified by that same
payment r;ard brand.

This is not essential, as the Acquirer can instead opt to pass such request on to the
payment card brand for processing.

5.5.6. Issuer Certificates
Issuers can likewise opt to be a Certificate Authority in order to issue certificates to
cardholders. As with Acquirers, this requires that they in turn be certified by the
payment card brand.

Issuers may also opt not to be a CA, and to pass all such requests on to the payment card
brand for processing.

5.5.7. Root Key
The rm,t ltey is the primary building block of the SET certificate hierarchy, or indeed
any certit'icate hierJrchy, as it is with this key that the authenticity of any certificate is
ultimately verified. 1 '·-'nsequent!y, the security and integrity of the root key is of
paramount importance.

The root key is available to software vendors to include with any SET compliant
software they develop. It is distributed in a selfMsigned certificate, which can be
validated by sending a hash of the certificate to the originating Certificate Authority. In
the rare case that a vendor has an invalid root certificate, the Certificate Authority will
respond by sending a valid copy of the root certificate in the response.
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When a root key is generated, a replacement root key is also generated. This
replacement key is the next descendant of the current key. i.e. will be used to replace it
when required. A hash of the replacement root key and the self-signed certificate of the
current root key are distributed together.

When the root key is to be replaced, SET software is notified by the delivery of a selfsigned certificate containing the new root key, and a hash of the new replacement key.
The new root key is verified by calculating itf. hash and comparing it to the previous
replacement root key hash.

5.6. Limitations
The SET specification documents clearly state that only transactions involving payment
cards are within their scope. Despite the many strengths of the SET protocols, this
appears to be the one possible weakness in the overall approach that is being adopted in
the construction and marketing of the specifications. To understand why this is a
problem, the usefulness of payment cards on the L'l•;err..tt r:tocds to be evaluated.

5.6.1. Advantages
Because most payment card brands are supported by a large number of financial
institutions, they represent a payment system that should be able to cope for the
foreseeable future with the constantly increasing number of users of Electronic

C'nmmerce. This does presuppose the fairly immanent establishment of a broad
payment inf:astructure. However, with inception of co-operative efforts like EDS
ReadySET ("EDS, HP and VeriFone Team to Lower Costs and Simplify Operation of
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Internet Processing Services for Banks and Financial Institutions", 1997, [on·line]), a
global payment infrastructure available to all banks, this should be achievable.

The use of dual signatures in SET assures cardholders that they will have the maximum
possible privacy of information when using payment cards. Not only will the banks get
no more infonnation about transactions than they already do with current systems, but
merchants will no longer get any card details whatsoever. This segregation of
information should prevent any unwanted additional analysis of individual spending
patterns, while at the same time providing reasonable auditability.

One of the most significant advantages of payment cards is the enormous existing
customer base. Payment cards are already possessed by many millions of people, major
brands are accepted by nearly every business, and the vast majority of financial
institutions already have the infrastructure to process such transactions. Because of this
broad base of support, this also means that payment cards represent a fairly reliable form
of payment. Ultimately, the number of payment gateways that will supp01t payment
card transactions should be large enough that if one server is unavailable, an alternate
server should be available to replace it temporarily without too much difficulty.
Although not stated specifically, it appears that the issue of availability of service is
outside the scopr. of the current SET specifications. The possibility of "Denial of
Service" attacks is deemed to be within the problem domain of a secure payment
processing infrastructure, rather than related to individual transactions.
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5.6.2. Disadvantages
Payment cards in general have a serious limitation for some Internet transactions. It is
likely that the Internet is going to spawn a variety of "micropayments", probably in the
order of a few cents, required for such things as royalty payments on information,
music, etc. The transaction charges attached to most payment cards, and the size and
speed of the SET transactions used to process them, make them inefficient for such
small payments.

Additionally, as payment card transactions are currently classified as Mail Order/
Telephone Order (MOTO) transactions, and as such attract much higher charges than
face-to-face payment card transactions, businesses are less likely to accept this form of
payment for relatively small amounts (Till, 1997, [on-line]).

5.7. Summary
This Chapter described the structure and security features offered by the SET protocols,
which when employed fully for Electronic Commerce transactions will provide:
};- Effective authentication of all parties in a transaction, including verification
of their authority to partidpate using specific payment card brands,

>-

Easily verifiable digital Ct!rtificates based on a purpose-specific hierarchy of
trust,

>-

Secure and verifiable transmission of data,

>-

Privacy of payment information, and

>-

Non-repudiation of transactions.
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Chapter 6 compares SET and SSL to determine their relative effectiveness, and
investigates the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the protocols in providing
secure transactions for Electronic Commerce.
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6. Comparing SET and SSL
As was discussed in Chapter 2, the fundamental requirements of a commercial
electronic transaction can be summarised as follows:

};- Strong authentication of the identity and authority of all parties,
}- Compatibility of payment method,
}- Security of payment information at receiving end,
}- Security of all information in transit against alteration, deletion or modification,
and
}- Non-repudiation for all parties.

6.1. Authentication
The need for fairly airtight authenticntion is obvious. Without it neither party can be
sure of with whom they are dealing, or whether they have the authority to perform the
transaction. The key tools used to provide authentication are digital signatures and
digital certificates.

6.1.1. SEl:
SET provides strong authentication through the use of digital certificates issued from a
purpose specific Root CA.

These certificates are virtually impossible to forge, as they must be created using a
succession of signatures starting with the root key, which is known only to authorised
developers and CAs. Likewise, an earlier recipient cannot reuse them to impersonate a
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particular party. For example, a cardholder's certificate cannot be reused in future
transactions, as the secret value needed to authentic<tte the link to the certiticate is
known only to the cardholder's software. Similarly, merchant key-exchange and
signature certificates are useless to third parties, as they would not possess the
corresponding private keys.

Although normally considered weak when used alone (see Section 3.3.1 ), the additional
authentication offered by the use of digital signatures under SET is significant, as the
SET signature certificate provides confirmation of the link between a cardholder and a
payment card.

6.1.2. SSL
According to Freier, Karlton & Kocher ( 1996), SSL provides three distinct possible
levels of authentication: authentication of both parties, server authentication with an
unauthenticated client, and total anonymity. As can be observed from this, the use of
certificates for authentication under SSL is optional. However, even assuming that in
the case of Electronic Commerce certificates would be mandatory, SSL only uses such
certificates to identify the server and the "client". No connection between the client and
the payment method being offered is verified. Potentially this opens the way for
payment card fraud if individual card details are compromised.

Additionally, the SSL protocol uses X.509 digital certificates, which presents a problem
with widespread key distribution and authentication due to the poor uptake of the X.SOO

directory services (Reid, 1996, p. 667).
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6.2. Compatibility
Before a cardholder provides a vendor with their payment card details, they want to be
sure that the merchant in question is authorised to accept that form of payment.
Likewise, the merchant needs to confirm that the client is the legitimate holder of the
payment card being offered.

6.2.1. SET
Once again SET achieves this through the use of certificates. SET certificates provide
confirmation of the relationship between a cardholder and the payment card being used
(currently optional, see Section 5.5.2), and evidence of a merchants identity and
confirmation of their authority to accept transactions using a given payment card brand.

All certificates issued by the SET "hierarchy of tmst" stem from the payment brand (see
Section 5.5.3), thus ensuring that the party in question is authorised to accept or use that
type of payment card. For consumers, this provides similar authentication to the decal
displayed in an ordinnry shop window, only with greater surety.

6.2.2. SSL
Because SSL was not designed specifically for Electronic Commerce, it provides no
standard mechanism for this kind of authentication.

6.3. Payment Security
One big issue in the use of payment card<; at any level, electronic or otherwise, is the
privacy of the card details. Merchant fraud, i.e. merchants abusing payment card
information that has come into their possession through a prior transaction, currently
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accounts for approximately one third of payment card fraud (Computer Technology

Research Corp., 1996, p. 133).

6.3.1. SET
SET provides for the elimination of merchant fraud through the use of dual signatures.
This means that merchants never gain possession of payment cards details. Instead they
merely receive verification of the details and card ownership from the Acquirer.

6.3.2. SSL
The SSL protocol is merely designed to set up a secure session between a client and
server. In the case of Electronic Commerce this means the consumer and merchant.
There is no provision in SSL specifically for the processing of financial transactions of
this nature. Payment card details a:e sent to the merchant, who then processes them as
they would in a normal MOTO transaction.

6.4. Information Integrity
Electronic Commerce requires that all financial information transmitted be secured
during transmission against accidental or deliberate alteration or interception.

6.4.1. SET
The cryptographic techniques used by SET are considered amply strong to thwart the
current level of possible cryptanalysis attacks ("Just How Strong is RSA in SET?",

1997, [on-line]). SET uses 1024-bit puolic key encryption (RSA), and 56-bit
conventional encryption (DES). Although this level of DES encryption has proven
breakable with modern cryptanalysis techniques (Ford & Baum, 1997, p. 104) (Pornpili,
1996, [on-line]), the SET protocol's use of dual signatures and digital envelopes mean
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that payment card details are also encrypted using RSA (see Section 5.4.1). Effectively
this means that even if an attacker succeeded in breaking the conventional encryption
used to encrypt the bulk of a message, the payment information would still be protected.

The use of digital signatures by the SET protocols ensures that the integrity of all
information transmitted can be verified by the recipient.

6.4.2. SSL
SSL only uses public key encryption and digital signatures during the initial
"handshai:::e" phase of a session. Thereafter it relies upon conventional encryption,
combined with keyed MACs, to protect and verity the integrity of data (see Section
4.1.1). The length of keys allowed under SSL varies depending on whether you are in

the US or not. Because an SSL session can be used for any type of transmission, not
just financial, its export is controlled by the Export Administration Regulations of the
US Department of Commerce (see Section 3.4.1).

According to the :....;e:t.c,;cape Policy on Encryption Export ( 1997), current US legislation
only allows the export of SSL versions that use a maximum 40-bit 1;onventional
encryption key. Netscape itself admits that this is inadequate for high levels of security.
Indeed, the current version of SSL has already been cracked at least once (Pompili,
1996, [on-line]).

Versions of SSL available within the US are far stronger, but as Electronic Commerce is
already a global issue, this is of small comfort to consumers in general.
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6.5. Non-repudiation
Both consumers and merchants alike need some assurance that the other party involved
in a transaction is going to fulfill their part in the exchange. Consumers don't want to
make payment and then not receive what they paid for, and merchants don't want
consumers disputing the payment after the goods or services have been delivered. Both
parties need a method of proving the others agreement to the original transaction.

The use of public key cryptography provides a minimal level of non-repudiation.
However, as was discussed earlier, this does not stop someone from fraudulently
claiming that his or her private key was compromised and used by an unknown third

party.

6.5.1. SET
Through the combined use of digital signatures, key-exchange certificates, and signature
certificates, SET effectively eliminates the possibility that either party in a transaction
could viably repudiate a transaction. In many countries, including Australia, digital
certificates are now admissible under the Laws of Evidence as proof of identity.

6.5.2. SSL
Assuming that an SSL session was established using digital certificates to authenticate
both parties, and that a reliable CA issued the certificates in the first place, then SSL
provides a reasonable level of non-repudiation.
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6.6. Summary
In fairness, it should be noted that SSL is a general protocol for securing network
transmissions, and was not designed for Electronic Commerce specifically. However,
the conclusions seem fairly self-evident; the SET protocol, which was designed
specifically for Electronic Commerce transactions, offers many clear advantages over
SSL when used for this purpose.

Both SET and SSL can provide authentication through the use of digital certificates and
digital signatures, but only SET can provide a positive link between the parties in the
transaction and a specific payment card brand.

Both protocols provide :-Jasonable message security and integrity through the use of
encryption techniques. However, the use of dual signatures in SET provides for
significantly higher protection of payment information. There is little doubt that SSL is
less resource intensive than SET given its reliance on conventional cryptography to
perform the bulk of the encryption load. However, the strength of the encryption
employed in the international version of SSL, that is the version released for export
from the US (see Section 6.4.2) is significantly weaker than that employed by SET.

Finally, both protocols use certificates that provide a level of non-repudiation.

However, the use of multiple key/certificate pair& in SET provides additional proof of
participation.
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Of course, no system is one hundred percent foolproof (if it is, someone just invents a
better fool), but it appears that when performing electronic transactions using SET, the
only weak link is the users. If someone who knew a users password(s) and payment
card details were to gain access to that users computer, then they would conceivably be
able to impersonate them. However, this scenario is unlikely to present itself where any
remotely responsible user is concerned. This may be especially true in future, as it is
likely that smart cards will eventually be used to store sensitive information such as
digital certificates. This will allow users to carry their digital certificates and secret
values around in their pocket, providing greater mobility and additional security to the
overall scheme.
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7. Conclusions
The previous discussion clearly illustrates the effectiveness of the SET protocols in
securing electronic transactions using payment cards. The levels of cryptography used
by SET are such that only the most powerful adversaries, which basically means

governments and other major organisations, would realistically have the resources to
break such encryption in any remotely useful timeframe. Of course, as mentioned
earlier, key lengths will need to continue to increase commensurately with
improvements in cryptanalysis techniques in order for this to remain true. Given that
SET is primarily aimed at protecting individual consumers, the possibility of such an
organisation dedicating the resources required to the task of acquiring individual
payment card information would seem to be remote in the extreme, with possible rare
exceptions.

SET uses a sensible balance of conventional and public key cryptography. While it uses
the faster conventional cryptography to do the bulk of encrypting, it still uses additional
public key cryptography in each message to give added security where needed, and to
provide additional authentication, verification and non-repudiation.

The use of certificates, iss_ued from a purpose specific hierarchy of trust, provides a high
level of confidence in the authentication process. The special care that is given to
maintaining the integrity of the root key guarantees the reliability of this system.

Widespread adoption of the SET protocols could take some time, but not overly so
given the care that has been taken to assure that the SET specification incorporates a
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high degree of interoperability. Many organisations are already working on, or in some
cases already providing, software certified to the current SET standard. A good
example of this is CyberCash, which began trials long before SET was conceived of,
and now offers SET compliant products as standard.

7.1. Payment Systems
From the study provided herein, it would certainly appear that the SET protocols
adequately address the primary areas of concern in Electronic Commerce. The only
apparent weakness, within the scope of the SET specifications, is the fact that they focus
exclusively on payment cards. Current payment cards, Visa's WebCard not
withstanding ("WebCard Visa", 1997, [on-line]), by themselves are unlikely to prove
adequate to offer a total payment solution to Internet shoppers over the long term due to
the advent of Internet micropayments.

Other payment methods such as NetCheque and ecash purport to have small enough
transaction fees to meet the need for <nicropayments. Consequently, in order for the
SET protocols to overcome this problem, a number of possible solutions suggest
themselves.

First is the introduction of a new form of payment card, p0ssibly by a third party
company, which accumulates micropayrnents until they reach a predetennined amount.
The consumer then pays this as a lump sum using a standard payment card type. This
would amortise the single transaction fee over a large number of micropayments, thus
reducing it to an acceptable amount per transaction.
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The second solution is for the SET specifications to be broadened to include a general
protocol available to a variety of different payment types. This would have the added
advantage of allowing consumers to either consolidate necessary online financial
accounts, or at least to be able to easily transfer funds between different accounts.

However, irrespective of the above concerns regarding payment cards, the fact remains;
the SET protocols effectively provide a level of security for payment card transactions
that should satisfy all but the most hardened cynic.

According to Visa, the future direction of the SET protocols will be primarily towards
the integration of new technologies such as smart cards. "Smart" Visa cards will use
integrated circuit chips to allow payment cards to store more user information, to
provide portable authentication certificates, as well as allowing them to be used as
electronic purses ("What's Next?", 1997, [on-line]). This means that users will be able
to download cash values from their existing savings accounts and store them on their
Visa card for later use. This may offer a solution to the problem of the high transaction
charges associated with payment card usage. However, this has yet to be confirmed by
the payment card brands.

~E~d~lt~h~C~o-w_a_n~U~n~iv-e~r~s~1cy--------------------------------------------

82

The Development and Use of the Secure Electronic Transaction Protocol on the Internet

7.2. The Future of Electronic Commerce
In his closing comments on the advantages of commerce on the Internet, Watson (1997)

predicts:

"The late 1990s will see some further debate over the security of the Internet for
conducting business. There will be cases of misuse and fraud, [although]
probably a reduction over current levels of such activity. The law will have
difficully coping at first and as usual legislation will trail the need, problems of
international boundary transaction jurisdiction will arise, governments will
figure out how to tax the Internet and by 2005 the vast majority of business
world-wide will operate in this environment. Do we expect anything else?"

In the mere eleven months since the above comment was published, much of what was
said in it is already proving true. The laws of many nations have indeed been greatly
troubled by jurisdictional issues over the past year, and consequent legislation and
international agreements have been forged to try to cope with these difficulties. Current
legislation in many countries is undergoing constant review in order to facilitate the
accelerated growth of Electronic Commerce without compromising national security, as
demonstrated by the amendments to the US export policies ("Cryptographic Policies",
1997, [on-line]).

A growing number of businesses are daily exploring the possibilities offered by this new
medium, while governments are trying to determine exactly how they can get a larger
share of the profits. Financial payment infrastructures are being developed, often with a

Edith Cowan University

83

The Development and Use of the Secure Electronic Transaction Protocol on the Internet

helping hand from the major software houses, who are highly motivated by the potential
profits of increased software sales and dependency to give the electronic shopping
movement greater impetus.

Concerns about the safety of the Internet as a whole are being swiftly addressed, and
with the number of users rapidly increasing, it would seem that this is being achieved to
the satisfaction of all but the most skeptical.

So, do we expect anything else? The answer has to be "No", given that government, the
private sector, and the public all appenr to want this brave new world of cyber-shopping.
When the resources of the world are focused on making a viable vision become reality,
only a brave person would suggest that they will not ultimately succeed. A more
pertinent question might then be, "At what cost"?

7.3. Future Research
The SET specifications provide protocvls that adequately demonstrate all the necessary
functionality required for secl!re Electronic Commerce, including the interoperability to
integrate both current and future technologies, and the modularity to adopt new
techniques. Considering this, it would seem that the main requirement for future
research lies predominantly in the area of payment systems as a whole.

The requirement would appear to exist for the development of a holistic payment
system, and the supporting payment infrastructure, which integrates the best attributes of
all current payment systems. Retail Electronic Commerce is a new arena of
consumerism, with new payment requirements, which requires an equally original
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payment system for it to function in an optimal manner. It is probable that the mere
adaptation of current payment methods will fall short of providing the most efficient and
acceptable solution.

The final solution to this problem will probably incorporate aspects of current payment
systems, but with a ubiquitous payment infrastructure that allows users to use all
payment methods from a single financial base, and with uniform transaction protocols.
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Appendix A
Payment mechanisms designed for the Internet
Name
Anonymous Internet

Intenu.·t Reference
llno:/h.!:tn~c-..n.tcd.idnwpc•itrdl'nljt•ct/Onint<.'rn<.'t/;tcdn~l.p~

Mercantile Protocol
BankNet

llttn: 1/lllkii.C<l"'"liUh:lllk

Brand's Cash

llttn://www.c" i.ttl/-hr.tnd,/

BuyWay and BuyWayPS

lliw.:i/\1'11 w

CARl

I lllp://11".' 11 .llc'ltc'""·''n'.c·, llllillt'h';tl'l htrnl

CheckFree

I hlp: I{\\ \\ 11 c·h L'L"k t"rc"l" .l"< lilt/

ClickS hare

llitrrj/11 ww d tl'h'[ht!<' l'< •rn{t'IH;k,h;ucl

CommerceNet

Hnp:J/•.1·" ,,

,·"nHm'll"<"

Credit Card Network

lliIJl:/IWI' "

.l"JS.d.il!!<J.0.!.Tl! 1

Cybank

~i/W\1 1\.L')..b_;LIJ~. lll'li

CyberCash

I !t ![1 :1/w" 11 .<·, ·hc·r,·;t,h l '1m/

CyberSource

Uttp://11 II II

Digital Silk Road

)Jtlp://11 11 w .ao;,,,.j,.,_,.,Hn/d-.r.html

Downtown Anywhere

iittp·fi~I.!H"IliH/

Ecash

llttp:l/wll 11 .<lto;t.:a,h.ro>m/

Electronic Funds

I lttp:/hl WI\ .L'IIIIid'.\''Hil/

11 !ll.tl'l tmnwd i a.r< llltfhn\'\l';l\'lt nl n 1hw. htlll

,.,

ru:t/

h•:f,O\IIc"L' l"Ol!lll

Clearinghouse, Inc.
Electronic Lottery Tickets

I i l! p:lII ht u~f\' It.,_ mil .t•tlu/- ri \\':-tilt >llco~

Evend

I htp:/11\'11'1\' .<'l't'nd nnn/n end h<Hm:Juml

First Bank of the Internet

II<! p:II!!:JIH.'l''>. L">. tnl il'lllK'(lC;t c'< ·II 'rn!cc·t/Prc.~.~llllt 1i. htnJl

{defunct)
First Vir!ual

llnp;/iwll'w.fv.roml

FSTC Electronic Check

1h1p:/lwww .t .. tc.or~l

Project
Globe 10

l-lnn:l/e Inhe id. ~l'tc•dt.fr/

IKP

lin p:llw~>w .1urid1. ihm ..:nm: ROrrcchnnlngy/Securit't'ft•xtcrn/ccummerccli KP. t'tml

!PAY

!Itt n:l/ww w. i me .nrWict f. pn\lic•t f-pay-chartt·r

lwinpak

I Itt r:f/www. i wi nlli!hJ;.wnl

Java Electronic Commerce

Ht tp:l/):t\':L ~u n.l'onliprnduc·t slcnmmercd

Framework
LETSystems

lin p:/fwww. gmlct~.u-nct.C<ltlli

Magic Money

Http:/fgangcs.cqnl.iclmcm;irce/P[Oi!;c!/Oni!JICrnct/mnl.hln)l

MarketNet

!Itt p:l/mkn .cn.uk:HO/
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Micro Payment Transfer

Http://www.w3.orr<@/WD-mptp
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